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ABSTRACT
This contribution looks at the interplay of different logics of
governing the environment, resources and people in Cambodia
that materialise in overlapping zones of exclusion, thereby co-
producing new relations of resource control in a complex frontier
constellation: a frontier for water, forest and carbon commodities
and also for state control. Focusing on three Clean Development
Mechanism (CDM) hydropower dams, the paper analyses a partly
unintentional, but significantly consequential coalescence of
distinct spaces of governing located in the Cardamom Mountains:
a forest conservation zone, the CDM technological zone, an
enclaved corporate hydropower zone and a semi-official timber
logging zone. While the CDM element has exposed the projects
internationally, it has obscured several problematic aspects and
dynamics of resource politics connected to the dams that are
revealed in this paper. These include the vulnerabilisation of local
fisher communities, incarceral labour practices on the dams’
construction sites and accelerated logging in the conservation
zone. The paper also shows how the interaction of the studied
zones takes place through their distinct mechanisms of exclusion
with the effects of more centralised resource control and the
bracketing of the associated dispossessions.
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1. Introduction
This contribution analyses the interplay of the differing logics of resource control that shapes
dynamics in a complex frontier constellation andproduces spaces of governing that intersect
with each other in consequential ways. The focus is on three Clean DevelopmentMechanism
(CDM) hydropower dams in Cambodia – Atay, Tatay and Russei Chrum – which have been
developed by Chinese companies under concessionary arrangements. These are among
the most significant foreign direct investments in the country (1.3 billion USD in total) and
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comprise fenced enclaves with a high rate of corporate regulatory autonomy. They are
located in the CardamomMountains in south-west Cambodia, next to the border with Thai-
land, within one of the largest remaining forest areas in mainland South-east Asia.
The CardamomMountains are an example of a resource-rich site, attracting actors operat-
ing on various scales andwith interests ranging from resource extraction to conservation. The
different ends andmeans of resource control (Peluso and Lund 2011) present in the area also
overlap and interact with each other in important ways, something that is becomingmore of
a norm than an exception in the remaining resource-rich areas of South-east Asia (Eilenberg
2014), and even globally. As these entanglements cannot be fully grasped through the more
conventional project-by-project or ‘sectoral’ approaches, new analytical lenses and concep-
tualisations developed in close connection to empirical realities are required (Baird and
Barney 2017; Hunsberger et al. 2017). Our study aims to contribute to this task.
To make sense of the observed, complex dynamics in the Cardamoms we developed a
novel approach, conceptualising the interconnections between different resource control
schemes as overlaps in zones of exclusion. In our study these include: (1) a conservation
zone co-governed by international conservation organisations and national authorities;
(2) a technological CDM zone of global climate governance; (3) enclavistic Chinese corpor-
ate hydropower zones; and (4) mobile, semi-official logging zones. They share common
features in that they are non-contiguous spaces of governing and regulation constituted
by regimes of exclusion. Yet they are also heterogeneous not only in their aims and means
but because they include both territorially fixed spaces (conservation, hydropower and
logging zones) and non-territorial regulatory spaces formed by technical practices (CDM
zones). We examine their operations and governing logics, how they relate to each
other and with what effects, bringing forth the interaction of different resource control
schemes that often remain invisible but nevertheless may be consequential. This in turn
contributes new perspectives to discussions on the frontiers as sites of co-production of
resources and states (Bridge 2014; Eilenberg 2014; Rasmussen and Lund 2018) and con-
nects these discussions to the studies of enclaved spaces of governing (Ong 2006).
Analysis of the study’s CDM element casts light on how climate governance initiatives
may become intertwined with on-the-ground resource politics, something continuously
overlooked in the climate domain (Käkönen et al. 2014; Eriksen, Nightingale, and Eakin
2015; Leach and Scoones 2015). It also opens up the politics of commodity production
– the socio-ecological and labour relations – that are hidden by the end product of certi-
fied emissions reductions (Milne 2012; Peluso 2012). Furthermore, problematic aspects
and adverse outcomes of the CDM hydropower dams, such as the vulnerabilisation of
fisher communities, incarceral labour practices and accelerated logging in the conserva-
tion zone, are revealed, none of which are visible in the CDM documents, the only official
publicly available records connected with the projects.
Primary research data are drawn from relevant policy and project documents, newspa-
per articles and fieldwork carried out mainly in March 2013 and February/March 2014. The
informants of the 23 thematic interviews included relevant ministry officials (especially
those with connections to the CDM projects) and journalists as well as non-governmental
organisation (NGO) staff and activists engaged in conservation and human rights. Some of
the interviewees from the ministries we interviewed for the first time in 2011. Most
of these interviews were carried out in Phnom Penh and Khemara Phoumin, the capital
of Koh Kong province. Despite concerted efforts we could not gain interview access to
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representatives of the hydropower companies. During the two and half months of field-
work around eight days were spent in villages. The community-level group discussions
with villagers and interviews with local ex-workers in dam construction and village
chiefs (38 interviewees in total) were carried out in two communes in the province of
Koh Kong where most of the dams’ downstream impacts are experienced: Bak Khlang
downstream from the Atay and Russei Chrum Dams, and Tatai Kraom downstream from
the Tatay Dam. Around half of these discussions were carried out by Try Thuon (second
author) in Khmer and the rest by Mira Käkönen (first author) via a translator.1
We begin by explaining and contextualising key conceptualisations. We then outline
the history of Cardamom’s resource frontier closure by conservation schemes and later
partial reopening for extractive hydropower dams, including discussion of their conces-
sionary governing mode. Thereafter we demonstrate how the technological zones
(Barry 2006) of the CDM and environmental impact assessments (EIAs) have bracketed
the dispossessions produced by the dams. We go on to show that the exclusivity and
legal exceptionality of the corporate hydropower enclaves enable and shield exploitative
labour practices; then, aligning with and building on Milne’s (2015) findings, we discuss
how hydropower projects together with the control mechanisms established for conserva-
tion purposes interact with exclusive zones of logging. We conclude by underlining the co-
constitutive elements of the overlapping zones of exclusion, bringing forth how resource
extraction and power relationships are co-produced in complex frontier constellations.
2. Frontier constellations and zones of exclusion in Cambodia
The past decades of changes in the Mekong countries like Cambodia have been mostly
viewed through the lens of transitioning from battlefield to marketplace (Glassman
2010), bringing into focus how the years of civil war, insurgencies and Cold War legacies
kept Cambodia largely disconnected from transnational circuits of capital and how shifting
from a command economy to freer markets since the 1990s has been influenced by the
World Bank and International Monetary Fund doctrines of investor-friendly regulations.
As Dwyer (2011) has noted in the case of Laos, however, both sides of the equation are
important: the ‘marketplace’ for opening up resources for wealth accumulation, and the
‘battlefield’ for consolidating fragmented sovereign powers and territorial state control
(Lund 2011). In Foucauldian terms two differing, yet interacting, governing rationalities
are present – the securing of global circulation and territorial fixation (Foucault 2007,
2008). The latter can be understood to include both the rationale of fixating state sover-
eign territorial authority and its exclusivity, and the strengthening of the state capacities
to control resources and people within this territory. The liberal rationale of securing
global circulation, in contrast, includes the establishment of ‘conditions for the organiz-
ation of world market’ (Foucault 2008, 56) and thus enabling of the globalising operations
of capital.2 Both rationalities are part of shaping the resource-rich Cambodian ‘hinterlands’
that form complex frontier sites at the edge of both the global capitalistic economy and
1The topic is politically sensitive; thus, preserving anonymity of all interviewees is critical.
2The rationale of territorial fixation is thus about centripetal logics of spatial ordering geared towards the state, with unlim-
ited ‘reason of state’, whereas the rationale of securing global circulation is about centrifugal logics of spatial ordering
geared towards enabling global circulation and the formation and expansion of global systems, accompanied by the
liberal ‘reason of least state’ (Foucault 2007, 44–45, 2008,52; see also Sassen 2006).
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state rule. Frontiers have long been regarded either from the perspective of expanding
capitalism and logics of accumulation (Hall 2012) or as political borderlands at the
margins of state control (Hagmann and Korf 2012). More recently Eilenberg (2014) has
developed the concept ‘frontier constellations’ to capture the concurrence of expansions
in agrarian capitalism and state authority in the resource-rich borderlands of South-east
Asia. This conceptualisation opens up possibilities to account for the concomitance and
often co-constitutive relations between resource-making for the circuits and advances of
global capital, and state-making in terms of forming, consolidating and territorialising
state powers (Bridge 2014; Rasmussen and Lund 2018). It also allows analysis of how the
economic rationale of profit making and the political rationale of strengthening state
powers become entangled and form relations of mutual co-dependence (e.g. Emel,
Huber, and Makene 2011). We contribute to these discussions by studying a complex con-
figuration of different possible frontier constellations: a frontier for water, forest and carbon
commodities as well as for political control and state power consolidation.
We examine the frontier dynamics in the Cardamom Mountains via the interaction of
differing logics of resource control – that is, as effects of multiple determinations
‘shaped by interacting global forms and situated political regimes’ and irreducible to a
singular logic (Ong 2007, 8). The more ‘global forms’ of governing logics to be discussed
are mainly related to the securing of global circulation in the form of neoliberal logics,
shaping how the environment is used both as a ‘tap’ (source of raw materials) and as a
‘sink’ (space of pollution) (Moore 2015; Barney 2017). In addition, there is a preservationist
logic (Biermann and Mansfield 2014) present in the form of furthering protected areas as
promoted by international conservation organisations.3 Cambodia’s provision of a tap for
regional and global markets has been guided by neoliberal prescriptions of creating inves-
tor-friendly environments (Hughes 2009; Springer 2011); meanwhile, the new ‘economy of
repair’ (Fairhead, Leach, and Scoones 2012) provides opportunities to use the spaces of
pollution as bases of wealth accumulation. This takes place through neoliberalised
environmental governance wherein direct regulation is significantly replaced by market-
based solutions and the creation of new environmental commodities (Bakker 2005),
which, in the case of carbon markets and the CDM, imply the intention of monetary valua-
tion of the entire carbon cycle, although effectively only selected carbon dynamics are
accounted for (Bäckstrand and Lövbrand 2006, Lohmann 2008).
The resource-governing logics of the ‘situated political regime’ in Cambodia are mainly
authoritarian4 – governing through fear and sovereign rule of force – and neo-patrimonial,
or reliant on networks of loyalty and reciprocal favours (Un and So 2009; Cock 2010;
Hughes and Un 2011; Springer 2011; Biddulph 2014). The capacity of the Cambodian
state to act from a distance is built around reciprocal exchange of political loyalty and
access to key resources, the centralising of which has provided the current ruling party,
the Cambodia People’s Party (CPP), with its sovereign powers (Le Billon 2002; Hughes
2009; Hughes and Un 2011; Milne 2015). Timber rents in particular have been used to con-
solidate control over the ex-Khmer Rouge, the military, provincial strongmen and business
tycoons (Le Billon 2002; Hughes and Un 2011). Donor dependency has meant that
3These are in a way efforts at closing down parts of the opening frontiers, but still they do not exactly form a counter-force
but rather the other side of the coin of the commodification logic (Biermann and Mansfield 2014).
4These authoritarian logics of governing correlate with the rationale of territorial fixation and the intensification of the
state’s resource control.
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intensive resource exploitation shaped by patronage logics often remains a hidden tran-
script (Scott 1990) in resource governance, while more public policy documents and stra-
tegic development plans are aligned with donor expectations of good governance and
sustainability promotion (Le Billon 2000; Hughes 2009, 156–65). Neo-patrimonial and neo-
liberal logics, although often perceived as conflicting, have in the Cambodian case inter-
acted in mutually supportive ways: patronage arrangements have produced the stability
that is a precondition for ‘investor friendliness’ (Hughes and Un 2011). These arrangements
have provided the regime with coercive powers that are often crucial in creating resource
availability for large-scale corporate investments (see Levien 2012).
The current concession-based approach of promoting economic growth in Cambodia
can thus be seen as a co-produced assemblage (Collier and Ong 2005) of neoliberal,
authoritarian and neo-patrimonial logics with colonial legacies (Diepart and Dupuis
2014). International development banks have pressured Cambodia to make its legal
system more investor friendly and World Trade Organization compliant, resulting in the
2001 Land Law that created a category of ‘state private land’ that is ‘alienable’ and avail-
able for concessionaires (Dwyer 2015); currently more than two million hectares are
covered by economic land concessions, equalling over one-third of the country’s agricul-
tural land (Davis et al. 2015). Investment friendliness also materialises in the establishment
of Special Economic Zones (SEZs), with 30 currently approved (Open Development Cam-
bodia 2015). Most concessions are in the hands of foreign investors (mainly Chinese and
Vietnamese) but almost half of them are under okhnas – local tycoons with well-estab-
lished and formalised connections to the CPP elite – and operationalisation of both has
often required authoritarian decisions and violent displacements (Springer 2011;
Licadho 2014). Of particular interest for our study is the way this concession-based devel-
opment model materialises in a ‘chequered geography’ of non-contiguous zones of gov-
erning, a territorial fragmentation that partly undermines but also exerts and extends state
power through a kind of variegated sovereignty (Ong 2006). Unlike the high-tech zones in
Ong’s focus, many Cambodian zones are agro-industrial (rubber and sugarcane) and
extractive concessions (mining and hydropower). These tend to be enclaved as distinct
territorial zones carved out from national terrain and disembedded from surrounding
society, often entailing deviation from national regulations and – in the case of foreign,
especially Chinese, investments – possessing characteristics of extraterritoriality (Lyttleton
and Nyíri 2011).
The concept of zone is thus central in our analysis. In our deployment the zones are
spaces of governing that ‘emerge by parcelling off a bounded area as a specific regulatory
space’ and are thus non-contiguous and distinctive from their surrounding jurisdiction
(Opitz and Tellmann 2012, 263). There is significant heterogeneity inherent in the zones
as they may form spaces that are at once global and territorial (Opitz and Tellmann
2012), and they may take shape as territorially fixed zones (Vandergeest and Peluso
1995; Ong 2006) but they may also take shape as regulatory spaces formed by the stan-
dardisation of technical practices (Barry 2006). This heterogeneity is also present in the
zones we analyse. While the CDM (and EIAs) represent a space of governing formed by
technological devices and calculations (Methmann 2013) – that is, a technological zone:
‘[one] within which differences between technical practices, procedures and forms have
been reduced, or common standards have been established’ (Barry 2006, 239) – the con-
servation, hydropower and logging zones are more territorially bounded. The zones also
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differ from each other in that they are variously nested within the space of state rule, and
variously serve the rationales of global circulation and territorial state power consolidation.
For example, the hydropower enclave shares some features of global territoriality (Opitz
and Tellmann 2012) by facilitating global connectivity and providing foreign investors fric-
tion-free access to resources, and of extraterritoriality (Lyttleton and Nyíri 2011) in the
sense of the de facto authority of Chinese state-owned hydropower companies within
the enclave. The logging zone in turn rather resembles a kind of a micro-sovereignty
(Humphrey 2004). But both zones also serve the pursuits of state power consolidation.
Inherent to the zones are governing capacities but these are multivalent in the sense
that they may end up also serving other than initially intended purposes. A common
feature to all zones is that constitutive of the ‘zoneness’ are terms and mechanisms of
exclusion that in turn are essentially about establishing order or governability (Humphrey
2004; Li 2014). In our study two dimensions of exclusion are critical. Firstly, by exclusion we
refer to the regimes of exclusion (Li 2014) in relation to the resource control exercised
within more territorially bounded zones, emphasising especially the mechanisms that
delineate the resource uses and users that are allowed access from those that are excluded
(Vandergeest and Peluso 1995)5. Secondly, exclusion refers to practices that establish
boundaries for a particular ‘field of vision’ in which only certain aspects are included
while others are excluded (Dean 1999, 29; Barry 2006); these are constitutive of the tech-
nological zones of CDMs and EIAs. The boundaries maintained through these exclusions
are less clear than in the more territorial ones. Markedly novel in our study is the focus
on relations between these different zones of exclusion. We underline that, despite the dif-
fering purposes of the zones, their overlaps and interaction may create situations where
one zone provides enabling conditions for another, and that the interaction between
the zones can have significant overall power effects that bring changes to the relations
of resource control.
3. Cardamom Mountains: closures and openings of a resource frontier
Up until 1998 the Cardamom Mountains were the last refuge of the Khmer Rouge, which
protected the vast forests from widespread destruction, although not entirely from selec-
tive logging. Timber rents played an important part first in sustaining the insurgents, and
later in accommodating the interests of the ex-Khmer Rouge to those of the new rulers (Le
Billon 2002). During the 1990s the regime aimed to centralise control over timber exploi-
tation through a World Bank-assisted logging concession system that became strongly cri-
ticised by the international donor community and was therefore suspended by Prime
Minister Hun Sen in 2001 (Le Billon 2002). This provided an opportunity window for inter-
national conservation agencies that had realised the global importance of the Cardamoms’
conservation potential (Killeen 2012). In 2002 the protected areas increased significantly
with the establishment of the Central Cardamom Mountains Protected Forest (CCMPF),
which together with the already existing Phnom Samkos and Phnom Aural wildlife sanc-
tuaries contiguously covered over 1,000,000 hectares. In 2004 the Southern Cardamoms
5We align here also with the definition of exclusion by Hall et al. (2011, 7): ‘the ways in which people are prevented from
benefitting from things’ which encompasses a broader range of processes than concepts of enclosure, primitive accumu-
lation or accumulation by dispossession to include goals not reducible to profit accumulation.
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Protected Forest was formed (see Figure 1).6 The international conservation organisations
have been tightly woven into the governance of these protected areas, which form
Figure 1. Hydropower dams, reservoirs, protected areas (as since 2016) and villages in the Cardamom
Mountains. (Source: Open Development Cambodia 2017).
6In 2016 the protected forests were upgraded to national parks and transferred from the Forestry Administration to the
Ministry of Environment. The area under protection was also expanded, especially in the Southern Cardamoms.
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exclusive zones exemplifying fortress-type conservation with community-based elements
targeting those within and near the protected areas. The schemes have provoked conflicts
between conservationists and residents over resource use and access rights (Milne and
Adams 2012). These approaches, however, did not include evictions of local residents,
and there are villages inside the protected areas, as can be observed from Figure 1.
In light of developments in the past five years it seems the government rationale
regarding the Cardamoms is less about conservation as an end in itself and more about
its role in preventing forested areas from turning into ungovernable spaces, meanwhile
safeguarding valuable natural resources for future exploitation (see Kelly 2011). At the
time the schemes were initiated, Cambodia was relying on outsiders such as international
conservation NGOs to supply funds and means of control, seemingly giving them a strong
bargaining position in terms of the area’s governance. Yet, the schemes also enabled the
Forestry Administration and the Ministry of the Environment to establish their presence in
the Cardamoms, strengthening the state’s ability to exercise central authority over these
peripheral and contested areas and thereby facilitating state territorialisation (Vandergeest
and Peluso 1995; Baird 2009; Milne 2015). The government has also made it clear that it
does not want ‘too many’ entities co-governing resource use in the area. The listing of
the Cardamom Mountains as a World Heritage Site, for example, has been opposed
‘because it is a place for the construction of hydroelectric plants… [forming] an electricity
battery for Cambodia. These things belong to Khmers, so their use is to be… decided by
us’ (Hun Sen quoted in The Mirror 2007).
In terms of frontier dynamics, the conservation schemes have aimed at closing the Car-
damoms to peasants’ and in-migrants’ dispersed and decentralised forms of resource use,
although not always successfully (Milne 2012). At the same time, however, the area has
been opened to more centralised resource extraction in the form of large-scale hydro-
power schemes. The ability of the state to grant extraction concessions within the conser-
vation zone proves its superior public authority compared to international co-governing
entities; indeed, the pre-existing conservation regime inadvertently facilitated these con-
cessions. As Barney (2009) notes, resource frontiers are relational and often discursively
represented as unharnessed and empty, thus erasing from consideration existing resource
uses and users. In the case of the Cardamom Mountains the emptiness is relative but also
somewhat more concrete, a state to which the exclusionary conservation schemes have
contributed by at least partly slowing down the potential influx of new settlers to the
area. Hence the area remains very sparsely populated and direct impacts of the dams in
terms of the displacement and resettlement have been low – possibly, at least partly,
explaining the lack of strong local resistance.7
4. The concessionary governing mode of the hydropower dams
Like almost all hydropower projects in Cambodia, the Cardamom projects are Build-
Operate-Transfer (BOT) concessions as laid out in the World Bank-influenced 2001 Electri-
city Law aimed at creating favourable conditions for the private sector to lead
7One of the planned Cardamom dams, Cheay Areng, would have displaced around 1500 people but has been stalled,
mostly because of local resistance and unprecedented mobilisations supported by civil society groups (Hensengerth
2017). This seems to support the assumption that projects with heavy direct displacements are likely to be opposed.
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development in the power sector (Middleton, Matthews, and Mirumachi 2015). The Carda-
mom dams (Atay, 120 MW; Tatay, 246 MW; and Russei Chrum, 338 MW) are responsible for
most of the recent increase from 308 MW to 1584 MW by the end of 2014 in Cambodia’s
generation capacity; they are also part of the governmental strategy addressing the pro-
blems of expensive electricity and low domestic generation capacity with large-scale
hydropower production backed by coal plants (RGC 2010).8
The BOT schemes are meant to ‘mobilise private capital to provide infrastructure tra-
ditionally funded by the public sector’ (Bakker 1999, 225), thus manifesting the neoliberal
logic of contracting out core state functions to private providers (Islar 2012). The BOT terms
(30–37 years) ensure long-term revenue flows to project developers as the projects are
transferred to the government only in the final stages of the dams’ operational lives. Inves-
tor attractiveness has been further augmented with tax holidays, free-of-charge licences
and government guarantees to purchase the electricity (Hensengerth 2015). Decisions
are made in the Council for the Development of Cambodia, established as a ‘one-stop-
service’ for investors, chaired by the prime minister and composed of senior ministers
from the main government line agencies (Middleton 2008); rather exclusionary, they
easily align with the opaqueness of authoritarian powers. The Atay, Tatay and Russei
Chrum developers were contracted without public tendering or consultation, terms
were negotiated behind closed doors and the visible support of the highest-level auth-
orities influenced how these projects have been handled in the line ministries (Middleton
2008). This explains the relative ease of carrying out extractive projects within protected
areas and why, at least in the case of Atay, construction started before the EIA approvals
(IR 2015). Thus, the investors have benefited from both investor-friendly regulations and
the state’s ability to provide contractual authority (Emel, Huber, and Makene 2011) and
to make exceptions to normal regulations (Ong 2006) in ‘effective’ authoritarian ways.
Although the projects have been carried out by independent power producers (IPPs),
they are not ‘independent’ or private sector-led in ways often assumed for BOT/IPP pro-
jects (Middleton, Matthews, and Mirumachi 2015). Rather, they are run by Chinese state-
owned enterprises backed by Chinese public financiers, thereby blurring boundaries
between public and private. Prime Minister Hun Sen has praised the Chinese companies
for ‘adjusting their investment projects in accordance with their Government’s directions
and in line with the recipient country’s demand’ (Hun Sen/CNV 23 February 2013). He has
also framed the projects as evidence of the new strategic bilateral relations with Cambo-
dia, resulting in increased flows of Chinese investments and aid to Cambodia (Hun Sen/
CNV 12 January 2011). Still, the BOT/IPP model is significant as it provides considerable
autonomy to developers in conducting their operations and lends itself to enclavistic
development. Moreover, as such projects are carried out with scant state involvement,
they do not produce significant ‘hydraulic capacities’ for state planners or strengthen
the ‘bureaucratic state powers’ as has been the case in the conventional ‘hydraulic mis-
sions’ (Scott 1998; Molle, Mollinga, and Wester 2009; Harris 2012). Thus, although large
in scale, they do not provide the ‘means to demonstrate the strength of the modern
state as a techno-economic power’ (Mitchell 2002, 21). On the other hand, they are discur-
sively constructed as joint achievements requiring the decisive efforts of the ruling regime,
thereby demonstrating state power in other ways. Prime Minister Hun Sen has emphasised
8Nonetheless, electricity remains unevenly distributed, with a low electrification rate (34 percent, IEA 2015).
1200 M. KÄKÖNEN AND T. THUON
his role in mobilising necessary resources via his personal visits to meet ‘the Chinese
leaders’ while presenting the projects as reflecting his party’s provision of the crucial
investment precondition of stability in remote and previously ‘unruly’ corners of the Car-
damoms (Hun Sen/CNV 28 December 2010).
Overall, the exclusive corporate enclaves of the Cardamom BOT hydropower projects
exemplify a concessionary model of development in Cambodia which is shaped by a com-
bination of neoliberal investment policies and opaque authoritarian decisions. They
present the main new ownership regime over rivers with electricity-producing potential.
Although they depend on foreign developers and investors and do not strengthen
‘bureaucratic state powers’, they are framed as great achievements by the current
regime and are therefore tied to efforts to consolidate state power. Moreover, these pro-
jects are entangled with the multifaceted bilateral relationships between Cambodia and
China (Sullivan 2015) in which both profit accumulation and power consolidation matter.
5. The CDM’s and EIAs’ bracketing of vulnerabilisation
The global significance of the Cardamom dams is constituted through their linkage to
carbon markets. Cambodia has been a forerunner in the global carbon frontier in the
least developed countries (LDCs) amongst which it hosts the second highest number of
CDM projects (UNEP DTU Partnership 2016), with the Atay, Tatay and Russei Chrum hydro-
power dams producing the biggest share (76 percent) of the projected carbon credits (see
Table 1). The CDM has the dual objective of assisting industrialised countries to achieve
their emission-reduction targets by buying credits from mitigation projects carried out
in developing countries and assisting project-host countries to achieve sustainable devel-
opment. The final buyers of future credits from the Cardamom dams are Switzerland
(Russei Chrum), Sweden (Atay) and the Netherlands (Tatay) via carbon traders belonging
to the top 20 credit buyers (UNEP DTU Partnership 2016). The sustainable development
gains from Russei Chrum, Atay and Tatay are claimed to provide ‘great benefit to the
Table 1. Facts of the CDM projects.
Name of CDM project
activity Date registered
Annual
emission
reduction
(tCO2/year)
Project participants (host
country) Credit buyer
Lower Stung Russei
Chrum Hydro-Electric
Project
21 August 2012 701 China Huadian Lower Stung
Russei Chrum Hydro-Electric
Project Company
Switzerland via Vitol SA
Stung Tatay
Hydroelectric Project
14 December
2012
563 Cambodian Tatay
Hydropower Limited/China
Heavy National Machinery
Netherlands via Gazprom
Marketing & Trading
Singapore
Cambodia Stung Atay
Hydropower Project
19 December
2012
266 CHD Cambodia Hydropower
Development Company/
Datang (China)
Sweden via Tricorona
Carbon Asset
Management Sweden
There are 6 other
registered projects in
Cambodia:
4 biogas, 1 biomass, 1
waste heat/cement, 1
hydro
Between 2006–
2013
Total of the six
other
projects:
490.6
Buyers include
companies from Japan,
UK and Denmark
Sources: UNEP DTU Partnership (2016) and unpublished documents from Climate Change Department, Ministry of Environ-
ment, Cambodia.
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national economy and environmental sustainability’ (CDM-EB 2012, 2), stimulate local
economic development, ameliorate the electricity shortage (CDM-EB 2011a, 2011b,
2012) and create local employment opportunities during the construction and operation
periods (CDM-EB 2012, 2).
It is questionable whether the projects will produce ‘real’ emission reductions, however,
as they are hardly ‘additional’ (IR 2013) and they are indirectly linked to building coal
power plants to level seasonal fluctuations in the dams’ power production. In our analysis,
however, the focus is on how the seeming sophistication of performative equations
(Lohmann 2014) in accounting for ‘virtual’ carbon reductions (Cavanagh and Benjaminsen
2014) obscures the processes of vulnerabilisation, dispossession and exploitation that
have been part of the production of the ‘virtual’ carbon commodity. Initially, the CDM
was expected to result in projects that were ‘better than the baseline’, as put by an inter-
viewed official (in 2011), that is, better than could be achieved through the usual regulat-
ory measures – thus forming ‘sustainability enclaves’ (Whitington 2012). Instead, as shown
in the next sections, the Cardamom dam projects resulted in exceptionally exploitative
enclaves where environmental and labour norms have been suspended, seriously failing
in terms of delivering ‘sustainable development benefits’.
Here, it is worth reviewing how the CDM works as a technological zone that provides
common standards of critical importance to the functioning of global carbon markets.
The technologies at the core of the CDM relate to the production of certified emission
reductions, the commodity sold in the carbon markets, which must be defined technically
and legally and made transferable and tradable (MacKenzie 2009). This requires standard-
isation, simplification and commensuration by different scientific experts, verifiers and
monitors (Gupta et al. 2012). As for so-called sustainable development benefits it is the
host countries that hold the decision-making power over their standards and criteria
and evaluate whether they are met. As a result, they are not substantially included, but
rather are excluded from the global technological zone of the CDM, whose evaluative
grids effectively encompass only elements given value in terms of carbon. In the case
of the Cardamom dams and their CDM procedures, ‘non-carbon elements’ were mainly
addressed by referring to national approval of the projects and by using the projects’
impact assessments to demonstrate their sustainability. The officials in our interviews
were reluctant to discuss the Cardamom CDM dams, but some described the projects
as ‘political’ and hinted that despite the projects failing to meet the national sustainable
development criteria there was pressure from high-level officials to accept them. One offi-
cial even stated (February 2013) he was ‘surprised that the dam projects eventually got
registered [by the CDM Executive Board]’.
Next we examine how the indifference of the CDM’s technological zone to the sustain-
able development shortcomings of the dams was facilitated by the expediently limited
zones of impacts produced by the EIAs. Impact assessments supposedly constitute the
key device in informed consultations and decision-making by producing and presenting
the anticipated zone of impacts; they also define what is at stake and who is to be included
in, or excluded from, consultations (Lamb 2014). In the case of the Russei Chrum, Tatay and
Atay Dams, the EIAs produced a very limited zone of impacts, including only immediate
areas and mainly direct impacts such as biodiversity losses due to the reservoirs, while
excluding or seriously downplaying longer term losses in downstream fisheries and
related livelihoods. Consequently, not all affected people were consulted, while those
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who were did not anticipate the extent of dam-induced changes. Moreover, expectations
of benefits were raised by promises of electrification and compensation. Combined with
the absence of major immediate displacements, these problematic impact assessment
processes are likely to have lowered opposition to the dams.
The Tatay Dam EIA (KCC 2010), for instance, did not consider fishery impacts to be
relevant despite the fact that most of the 1000 people living along the Tatai River are
part-time fishers. On the Koh Pao River, downstream from Russei Chrum, fishing and
crabbing are the primary sources of livelihoods for many. Here the dam’s impact on
fisheries was at least acknowledged by the EIA; 1064 people in three villages were esti-
mated to be potentially affected (SAWAC 2010). However, if all the fishing communities
downstream along the Koh Pao River were taken into account the figure might be as
much as 20 times the EIA’s estimate: around 15,000–20,000 people in 10–15 villages.9
Even in the provincial capital of Koh Kong, located along the Koh Pao River the poorest
families fish regularly, and if they were included the figure would be higher still. All
interviewed villagers had noted a significant decline in numbers of fish after the con-
struction of the dams, also identifying the rampant sand mining in Koh Pao and Tatai
Rivers as a contributory cause. A study by Kastl et al. (2013) states that the two have
together caused a dramatic 70–90 percent reduction in fish catches in the downstream
areas of Tatai. It is the combined effect that worries many of the downstream residents
the most. As one in Koh Por commented (March 2014), ‘Less fish means less income. If
in the future there is no fish or crab what will happen, where do we go?…Maybe in
the future we will be forced to sell our labour’. The changes are experienced differen-
tially, and most heavily by the land poor who form the majority in the villages along
Koh Pao River.
Also excluded from the zone of impacts by the EIAs is the Koh Kong estuary, containing
the largest mangrove forests of South-east Asia and some of Cambodia’s best-known
coastal fishing villages, where crabs and fisheries are vital to sustaining most peoples’ live-
lihoods (Marschke 2012). Yet its mangrove ecosystems, fisheries and fishers are likely to be
significantly affected by the cumulative impacts of the dams (Killeen 2012; Kastl et al.
2013). Cambodia has been repeatedly identified as one of the most vulnerable countries
in the world in terms of climate change, with the most sensitive areas located along its
coast (BEH 2012). Yet it has been noted that the mangrove ecosystems ‘provide invaluable
protection from climate change impacts and create an environment in which communities
can build coastal resilience’ (Kastl et al. 2013, 4). Through damage to mangroves and fish-
eries the CDM dams are thus contributing to further vulnerabilisation of the coastal fishers
in terms of climate change.
The communities excluded from the projected impact zone were also excluded from
consultations, while the consent of those included was constructed by limited portrayals
of impacts and un-kept promises of benefits and compensations. For example, in Koh Por
village, downstream from Russei Chrum, people recalled how an EIA survey team con-
ducted door-to-door interviews, promising electricity at a reduced price. Yet all the elec-
tricity is being transmitted elsewhere and now the people of the village are
disappointed. As the village chief commented (March 2013):
9Estimate based on Dara et al. (2009), Kastl et al. (2013) and RGC (2014).
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The villagers didn’t understand what the survey team was actually doing. People just heard
they would get electricity and they were happy…. They said to villagers, that if we keep all
of nature in its natural condition you do not get any electricity… I think many were just think-
ing about the electricity and not, for example, the fish.
Only the chiefs of three villages, together with district and province officials, participated
in the formal Russei Chrum consultation meeting. The Koh Por village chief recalled that
some fishery losses were mentioned but compensation was promised, along with
support for people wishing to shift from fishing to aquaculture. These promises have
not been kept.
In the case of Tatay, formal consultations were more ‘participatory’ in the sense that
more villagers were present, but only in the first meeting. The consultation mostly con-
sisted of expositions on the benefits of the dam, and again electricity was promised.
According to some informants, critical questions were prevented by an intimidating
atmosphere. A foreign worker at an eco-lodge along the Tatai River described the first
meeting as ‘just a complete whitewash to tick the box to say the villagers are in
favour of the dam’ (March 2014). At the second Tatay consultation, in which almost
no locals were present, it was finally admitted that the electricity would go straight to
the Phnom Penh grid.
Each of the EIAs (KCC 2010; SAWAC 2010, 2011) concludes that all relevant stake-
holders supported the project but, as shown above, this consent was produced in pro-
blematical ways. The EIAs were not made publicly accessible and thus were never
exposed to broader public discussion. And, at least in the case of Atay, the EIA was offi-
cially approved only after dam construction had already started (IR 2015). The EIA results
were, however, more decisive in relation to accepting these dams as CDM projects, also
becoming partially public via the CDM project design documents and validation reports
that included copy-pasted excerpts from the EIAs and summarised key results. The
limited zones of impacts and the claims of local support for the projects were thus cir-
culated and reproduced in the CDM documents, but in so decontextualised a form that it
is impossible to assess the validity of the results. Thus, the manner in which the EIAs
entered the technological zone of the CDM further bracketed the dispossession and vul-
nerabilisation caused by the dams.
Via the CDM documents the EIAs had the performative role (Callon 2007) of produ-
cing the sustainability that is required for CDM projects to be approved by the CDM
Executive Board. Overall, the work of the CDM Executive Board is mostly tuned to
carbon assessments because the main role in calculating sustainable development
benefits has been assigned to the national authorities; the CDM architecture thereby
allows inadequate scrutiny, especially in the validation stage, for non-carbon elements,
and deploys uncritical and vague methods when cross-checking sustainability assess-
ments and consultations (Kuchler and Lövbrand 2016). After CDM projects have
been approved only emission reductions are constantly monitored, so once the pro-
jects have entered the carbon markets they become even more abstracted from
how and where the emission reductions are made (Lohmann 2008; Lovell and Liverman
2010); meanwhile, the socio-ecological interactions and the labour relations that are
essentially part of the production of the certified emission reductions commodity are
rendered invisible.
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6. The Chinese corporate hydropower enclaves
This section examines how the sites of Atay, Russei Chrum and Tatay form zones governed
principally by corporate authorities, and the modes of exclusion facilitating exploitative
labour practices. The hydropower concessions were granted to joint ventures of Datang
(Atay), Huadian (Russei Chrum) and China National Heavy Machinery (Tatay), all Chinese-
state-owned, overseas hydropower companies. The concessionary BOT/IPP hydropower
model lends these companies considerable autonomy in their operations. The projects
consist of fenced enclaves with special regulations, tax holidays and limited government
oversight, wherein the corporate authority exerts de facto control over the conditions of
living, labouring and the movement of people. In terms of these privileged rights and sur-
rendered degrees of state sovereign power these zones have ‘extraterritorial’ features (Lyt-
tleton andNyíri 2011) furthermanifested in Chinese being themain language used, and the
technical staff and a significant number of workers coming from China.10
The disconnectedness from surrounding society means that people outside have little
information on dam operations. When a partial collapse occurred at Atay, no details were
reported to the local authorities (IR 2015). Even the normal public disclosure mechanisms
are lacking, although operations, especially of the Russei Chrum and Tatay Dams, may
rapidly cause major water-level fluctuations (IR 2015). The people living in the vicinity
are concerned about dam safety and afraid of accidents. Downstream from Tatay a villager
from Anlong Vak commented (March 2013), ‘We lack information about the dam… If the
dam breaks we will die’. Information about working conditions inside has been almost
non-existent, as administrators, NGOs and other ‘outsiders’ are not allowed to enter the
zones. As an interviewed village chief observed (March 2014), ‘Local authorities don’t
know what happens inside. I have never been inside. But I know, if something happens
it is very different from the factories in Phnom Penh, as there is no union and no way
to complain’. An NGO representative working in Koh Kong’s provincial capital added
(March 2014) the observation, ‘Normally the role of our organisation would be to train
people in their rights as workers, but in this case the company controls the area so strictly
that we have had no chance for doing that’.
The number of workers at each site during the construction phase varies, according to
different sources,11 from 2000 to 4000.12 Harsh, incarceral labour conditions marked the
approximately five-year construction phase of the dams during which all workers had
to stay within the project site. The company provided them with accommodation and
food, and they were allowed out only on public holidays, if then. The interviewed ex-
workers complained (March 2013 and March 2014) of low salaries,13 maltreatment and
unsafe working conditions resulting in injuries that often went uncompensated.14 At
least fifteen people15 lost their lives in different accidents.
10For example, in the construction phase of Russei Chrum, out of approximately 2400 workers possibly 300–400 (IR 2015) or
even 500 (interviewed ex-worker, March 2015) came from China, as for Atay a senior engineer of Huadian estimated in
media that half of the 4000 workers were Chinese (Becker 2011).
11Media sources, interviews and the EIAs.
12Now that the dams are operational, only around 100–200 workers remain at each, and working and living conditions
seem to be relatively well organised.
13We were, for example, told that at Russei Chrum workers protested because of low salaries in 2011 and 2012, after which
monthly salaries were raised from 150–160 USD to 200–280 USD which still were considered low.
14Similar views have been presented also in media sources (e.g. Titthara and Boyle 2012).
THE JOURNAL OF PEASANT STUDIES 1205
The local employment opportunities that were promised, for example in CDM docu-
ments, were not taken up because after initial interest locals refused to work on the con-
struction sites which were eventually largely run with a migrant Khmer and Chinese
workforce. Apparently, it proved harder to turn the local villagers into ‘disciplined
labour’ than the migrants, who were more dependent on the employer and likelier to
obey the incarceral ruling. As a local NGO worker informant explained (March 2014):
The majority of the [local] people don’t want to work for them. Only those who have no other
choice…. The locals prefer to go to Thailand. And the fishermen prefer to fish… It is actually
easier to find loggers [for the companies contracted to clear the reservoir] than people to work
on the dam construction.
The highly contentious issue of the possible use of Chinese prisoners as forced labour
repeatedly arose in our interviews. Describing tunnel construction for Russei Chrum,
one ex-worker commented (March 2014), ‘Most people would be too afraid to do that.
This is why the workers…were mostly Chinese prisoners. After the… dangerous work
was completed the prisoners were sent back home’. It is difficult to verify to what
extent prisoners were actually used, but even if the stories are merely rumours they illus-
trate the suspicions that a gated, secretive enclave may trigger.
Local and national-level authorities have been reluctant to oversee safety issues or carry
out investigations of the incidents, reacting only after NGO or media interventions. While
workers’ rights in Cambodia are at best contested and emergent, the rise of concession
enclaves such as those described here have created ever more precarious working con-
ditions, leaving the workers disenfranchised with nowhere to look for protection. Non-
interference in exploitative labour practices appears to be a deliberate state strategy to
guarantee conditions of profitability for the project concessionaires (Arnold and Pickles
2011), to be measured against the larger complex of Cambodia–China relations (Sullivan
2015; see also Mohan 2013). The exclusiveness of the enclaves has sheltered the investors
and hidden the ways inexpensive labour has been produced and exploited.
7. Exclusive logging zones in the shadows of the hydropower dams
Infrastructures incorporate the power to rearrange relations between people and things
and reorganise access to material resources (Harvey and Knox 2015); they may also
shape activities in ways that ‘remain unstated but are nevertheless consequential’ (Easter-
ling 2014, 15). The infrastructure of the Cardamom hydropower projects consists of not
only dams but also transmission lines, reservoirs and new roads. The designated reservoir
areas are commonly first cleared of all vegetation to avoid eutrophication and methane
emissions from rotting vegetation, as well as disruptions in the water flow and the
waste of valuable timber. In the case of Cardamom dams the clearance permits, partly
facilitated by new roads, enabled logging that eventually extended well beyond conces-
sion boundaries. Roads as infrastructural forms subsume potentially unruly forces (Harvey
and Knox 2015) as they often instigate frontier dynamics (Tsing 2005) by making pre-
viously inaccessible areas accessible. In this way they create new possibilities for economic
circulation. However, in this case the flows of resources and profits were strictly controlled.
15The figure is compiled from media sources: Kongkea (2011); Chakrya (2011); Titthara (2011, 2012); Nimol (2011); Titthara
and White (2012).
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The mechanisms of exclusion and control of the conservation zone were significant in
ensuring the governability of logging activities (Milne 2015).
Two Cambodian-run companies with close ties to the country’s ruling elite (Milne 2015)
– MDS for Atay, and Timbergreen for Tatay and Russei Chrum – were authorised to carry
out the clearance. The logging contract for Atay in the O’Som commune was issued in May
2009. By June 2009 there were already reports of logging outside agreed boundaries (Shay
and Sokha 2009; Cambodia Daily 2009a; Cambodia Daily 2009b). An unpublished report by
an international conservation group in 2012 estimated that MDS operations extended into
conservation zones to the tune of 200,000 hectares, and at least 16,135 cubic metres of
rosewood had been logged. This alone would have made the company between 220
and 310 million USD.16 The main stocks of rosewood were exhausted by 2012, but less
intensive logging continued even in 2014 when the dam was already operational (Titthara
2014a). Actual reservoir clearance was only partial, causing problems in water quality (IR
2015) and – ironically for a CDM project supposedly mitigating climate change – higher
emissions of greenhouse gases.
As Milne (2015) has pointed out, Forestry Administration officials and military police not
only allowed but also facilitated the logging activities; their semi-legal involvement
enforced the exclusive monopolisation of logging by the licensed companies as Forestry
Administration’s conservation staff monitored activities in the area, and confiscated all
‘independently’ logged timber and handed it over to the licensee. In return the Forestry
Administration benefited from the arrangement through a kind of informal taxation,
receiving payments from every MDS truck of rosewood that passed its checkpoints. The
means developed for conservation purposes (and supported by international NGOs) in
terms of surveying, monitoring and control thus also served as mechanisms of exclusion
for logging purposes. The maps and knowledge of the locations of valuable timber also
benefitted the logging company.
Logging contracts for Tatay (2000 hectares) and Russei Chrum (1500 hectares) reservoirs
were awarded to Timbergreen in 2010. Again, logging extended well beyond the contract
boundaries and, according to informants and media sources, the mode and scale of oper-
ations were similar to those at Atay. An opposition member of parliament noted at the end
of 2011 that logging in Thma Bang was accelerating because loggers no longer worried
about getting caught; investigative journalists uncovered organised logging in the area
soon after (Boyle 2011; Stout and Chakrya 2011; Boyle and Titthara 2012). A well-known
environmental activist, Chut Wutty, who had attempted to expose Timbergreen’s activities
and its connections to military officials, was shot dead near Russei Chrum. This put Timber-
green in themedia spotlight for awhile, butno formal investigations followed,which suggests
that Timbergreen operations had silent authorisation from the highest official level.
The timber extraction operations were carried out in mobile logging zones character-
ised by exclusiveness and ‘exceptional rules’. As a local NGO representative commented
(February 2013): ‘Their [logging companies’] zones of operation move all the time. To
get in there is very difficult. They control all the movements of people’. The ‘exceptional
rules’ were captured by a journalist:
16Based on estimations in Pye and Titthara (2014); Titthara and Pye (2014); Pye (2015).
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In the town of Thma Bang, military police and soldiers infest the streets, patrolling the area like
a small, privately owned fiefdom. They are known to use intimidation against anyone poten-
tially jeopardising the interests of the… businessmen and officials profiting from the illegal
rosewood trade. (Titthara, Boyle, and Cheong 2013)
Different forms of intimidation by military police are effectively used to prevent any com-
petitors in the area. In some villages of O’Som ‘networks of spies’ have been reported to
inform the company middlemen if any of the loggers try to sell to other, potentially higher
paying buyers (Titthara 2014b). These mechanisms of exclusion further guarantee that
profits accrue to few, while the loggers themselves, whether migrant or local, are likely
to remain poor.
For Try Pheap, the okhna or tycoon behind MDS, Atay served as a testing ground for a
new modality of logging or ‘timber laundering’ subsequently replicated elsewhere (Global
Witness 2015; Milne 2015). In fact, Try Pheap has ‘[gained] a monopoly on all clearing,
trading and export of rare luxury timber species in Cambodia’ (Global Witness 2015, 18).
Meanwhile, the profits from logging are circulating in new activities such as SEZs,
mining concessions and holiday resorts. State powers granting permits and enabling
exclusive and rather violent resource appropriation have been essential to this circulation
and accumulation of profits.
Primitive accumulation and profit-making are, however, not the only logics at stake. Try
Pheap has been ‘allowed to get rich’, but only in return for loyalty and significant contri-
butions to the CPP-controlled off-budget funds used for roads, bridges, pagodas, schools
and administrative facilities (Global Witness 2015; Milne 2015). His company has also
funded several army battalions through a sponsorship programme (Global Witness
2015) established because ‘the Cambodian army is consistently short of resources’
(Verver and Dahles 2015, 62). Thus, the logics also relate to state power consolidation
and even to assembling the state’s sovereign powers of territorial control through
relations of patronage. Here the blurred boundaries of legal and illegal seem to work as
‘technologies of sovereignty’ (Humphrey 2004, 429). State-authorised clearance provided
the appearance of legality to logging outside the reservoir boundaries and enabled state
authorities (and conservation organisations) to ‘look the other way’ and bend rules on con-
servation and protected timber species without being overtly exposed to international
pressure and criticism. In this kind of terrain the powerful tycoons are perhaps kept
more ruly as ‘looking the other way’ can always be suspended. In addition, these semi-
legal arrangements keep a substantial proportion of the timber rents off the official
state budget and facilitate their channelling into CPP-controlled funds, thereby keeping
the capacities of the state dependent on the ruling party (Craig and Kimchoeun 2011;
Hughes and Un 2011; Milne 2015).
Timber extraction is organised in mobile, exclusive zones with their own coercive and para-
legal measures of control wherein regular laws are replaced by a system with its own rules of
operation, which makes use of the conservation zone’s regime of exclusion. At the same time
the zones operate in collaboration with elements of the state (including the Forestry Admin-
istration and military police), and produce funds partly channelled into functions integral to
state sovereign powers. Consequently, although the logging zones almost resemble a type
of micro-sovereignty (Humphrey 2004) with their own rule-making and enforcing capacities,
they are only partly excluded from the political space of state authority as they eventually also
serve the goal of the party-state to strengthen its sovereign powers.
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8. Discussion: the consequential interaction between the zones of
exclusion
We have examined the operations and governing logics of distinct zones of exclusion and
how they relate to each other. Here we bring forth more systematically the interaction
between the studied zones and the effects and relevance of this interaction that impor-
tantly takes place through the distinct mechanisms of exclusion that are constitutive to
each zone (see also Table 2). Our findings indicate that the exclusionary mechanisms of
the conservation zone enabled state territorialisation and, by limiting potential in-
migration, partly facilitated the major hydropower investments in the area. Together
with the conservation zone the construction of the hydropower dams enabled the emer-
gence of exclusive logging zones through roads and other infrastructure which made pre-
viously inaccessible areas accessible, and reservoir clearance permits which provided
cover for logging activities. Whereas the capital-intensive and concentrated, large-scale
hydropower production enables the establishment of exclusionary spatial enclaves, activi-
ties like timber extraction are harder to insulate in a similar way. The pre-existing exclu-
sionary conservation zone in the Cardamoms, however, partly constituted the
mechanisms of exclusion required for monopolised extraction of timber that is widely
spatially dispersed and requires relatively low capital investment.
The interaction between the zones through their exclusionary mechanisms was also
significant in terms of the politics of visibility. The CDM element has exposed the Carda-
moms’ hydropower projects internationally, but with the global gaze fixed on emission
units in international carbon markets, the CDM, along with the EIAs, has obscured the
ways the projects are intertwined with power relations and resource politics, as well as
the dispossessions and vulnerabilisation set in motion by the dams. Together, the exclu-
sionary hydropower and logging zones and the technological zone of the CDM have
kept socio-ecological consequences and exploitative labour relations largely invisible.
The interacting exclusionary hydropower and logging zones, along with the exclusionary
and limited field of vision produced by the technological CDM zone, at the time seemed to
align conveniently with the government’s intentions to keep ‘public transcripts’ of
resource use in line with sustainable development agendas while shielding authoritarian
and neo-patrimonial extractive practices from international oversight. Despite the increase
of Chinese aid and investments, Western donors have remained important, at least until
recent times,17 possibly with the rationale that good relations with Western powers
may counterbalance the increasingly powerful presence of China (Sullivan 2015).
The studied zones are variously nested within the space of state rule. Yet even the zones
most excluded from state control, like the semi-sovereign logging zones and the hydro-
power zones under the de facto control of the Chinese companies, became entangled
with the state’s efforts to strengthen its capacities for resource control. The zones also
varied significantly in their governing rationales. Yet even the zones that may most seem
to serve the securing of global circulation – like the CDM zone that facilitates carbon
markets and the concessionary BOT/IPP corporate hydropower enclaves – became
entangled with processes of state power consolidation, especially through their interaction
17More recently, however, the government has been increasingly more open in opposing all Western donor pressure and
opted more decidedly for increased reliance on Chinese investment and aid (e.g. Thul 2017).
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Table 2. Elemental aspects of the zones of exclusion discussed in the paper.
Zones Conservation
Hydropower
concessions CDM Logging
Timeline Phnom Samkos and
Aural Wildlife
Sanctuaries
established in 1993;
Central Cardamom
Mountains Protected
Forest established in
2002; Southern
Cardamoms Protected
Forest in 2004
Atay: Construction
started in 2008,
operational in 2014.
Russei Chrum:
Construction started
in 2010, operational
in 2014.
Tatay: Construction
started in 2011,
operational in 2014.
Atay: Registered 19
December 2012
Russei Chrum:
Registered 21
August 2012
Tatay: Registered 14
December 2012
Logging contract to
MDS for Atay in 2009,
peak logging period
2010–2011.
Logging contracts to
Timbergreen for Tatay
and Russei Chrum in
2010, peak logging
period 2011–2012.
Authority Co-governed by Forestry
Administration or
Ministry of
Environment and
international NGOs.
In the beginning some
resemblance to a
space administrated
by international NGOs,
but then increasingly
under the control of
state authorities.
State authorities
decide on the
establishment of the
hydropower
concessions.
Inside the zones, de
facto control over
people and river (+
other resources)
exerted by the
hydropower
companies (to the
extent of
extraterritorial
authority features).
International
accounting
standards under the
authority of CDM-
Executive Board/
Kyoto Protocol.
Host country’s
Designated National
Authority (in
Cambodia within
Ministry of
Environment) sets
criteria for
sustainable
development
benefits.
Logging tycoons with
rule-making authority,
para-military groups
with rule enforcing
authority.
State authorities
decide to ‘look the
other way’.
Purpose For the conservation
organisations:
preservationist logic.
For the state
authorities: state
territorialisation and
the closing of
ungovernable frontier
dynamics.
Profit-making for the
companies, but also
entangled in the
complex Cambodia–
China relations with
an economic and
political rationale.
Cheap emission
reductions to
companies in
Sweden, Switzerland
and Netherlands.
Profits from carbon
credits to
hydropower
companies.
Supposedly
sustainable
development for
Cambodia.
Officially reservoir
clearing, unofficially
monopolisation of
timber profits,
enrichment of local
tycoons and timber
rents for
strengthening the
party-state in a form
that provides
exclusion from any
external oversight.
Exclusionary
mechanisms
Different, surveying,
monitoring and
patrolling mechanisms
are used to control the
resource use and users
within the protected
areas.
Potential in-migrants,
‘land-grabbers’,
poachers, miners,
loggers are excluded,
although not always
effectively.
Strictly controlled
boundaries, state
authorities excluded
from oversight, NGOs
not allowed access
for monitoring. These
guarantee cheap
labour.
No evictions, but
exclusion of many
other ways of using
the rivers and related
resources; cf. impacts
on fisheries.
Different accounting
techniques establish
the boundaries of
the zone.
Labour conditions
and most of the
dams’ effects,
excluded from CDM
zone but through
problematic
measures (like the
uncritical use of
EIAs).
Intimidation and use of
violence is used to
exclude all competing
brokers and
independent loggers.
The controlling
measures of the
conservation zone are
also exploited to
guarantee the
monopolisation of
timber extraction.
Overlaps and
interaction
with the
other zones
Geographically the
hydropower and
logging zones are
nested within the
conservation zone.
Provided enabling
Geographically nested
within the
conservation zones.
Also part of the CDM
technological and
regulatory zone.
Hydropower dams are
partly nested within
the CDM regulatory
zone.
The carbon
reductionism of the
Geographically nested
within conservation
zones.
The logging zone is
triggered by the
hydropower dams and
(Continued )
1210 M. KÄKÖNEN AND T. THUON
with the other zones. The ways the zones fragment the space of state rule means that the
presence of state power in some processes of resource use is reduced, but this seems to be
more about variegated sovereignty than about compromised sovereignty (Ong 2006).
Our analysis of the dynamics related to the zones and their interaction emphasised the
entangled and often co-dependant relations between profit accumulation and state
power consolidation, as demonstrated by the complex of Sino–Cambodian relations
that forms around the hydropower enclaves, and by relations between domestic business
tycoons and ruling party authorities around the logging zones. The ruling party authorities
in Cambodia seem to be able to make at least some use of the enclavist concessionary
governing mode of hydropower for their own purposes despite, for example, the inhibited
production of state hydraulic capacities. The usual expectations of accelerated economic
development, local job creation, technology transfer and other similar ‘spill-over’ or ‘mul-
tiplier effects’ that are often used to justify the enclave model have been shown to mate-
rialise rarely in enclaved economies (Ferguson 2006), and the case discussed here is no
exception.18 It is, however, through other type of effects overflowing the enclave bound-
aries, like the triggered para-legal logging, that domestic accumulation of profits was
mobilised. And it is the rents from these activities that the current regime is able to use
for its own strengthening.
For the forest and fisher communities in south-west Cambodia the overlapping zones of
exclusion have decreased livelihood options, circumscribed resource-use autonomy and
increased labour market dependency. Yet neither dispossessed fishers nor intimidated
forest community members have significantly challenged the on-going resource appro-
priations. It appears that the lack of strong or concerted resistance has to do with the com-
bined effects of the different zones of exclusion. The conservation zone may have pre-
empted local resistance to the dams by keeping the area sparsely populated, thus contri-
buting to the lack of physical dispossession or displacement. The EIAs were used to buy
consent via the limited zone of impacts produced which excluded most of the losses in
downstream fisheries from consideration, while the CDM methods reproduced these
exclusions thereby excluding most of the dams’ serious effects from international circula-
tion. Finally, the zones of logging operations enrolled many of the villagers into semi-
illegal relations that made them evasive about making public claims.
There have been, however, some signs that the consolidation of the power of the Cam-
bodian state through the interplay of neoliberal, patrimonial and authoritarian logics of
Table 2. Continued.
Zones Conservation
Hydropower
concessions CDM Logging
conditions for
hydropower
concessions without
evictions and for the
monopolisation of
timber rents.
The construction of
the dams and
reservoirs triggered
logging within the
conservation zones.
technological zone
provides invisibility
to the dispossessive
socio-ecological
effects and
exploitative labour
relations.
it makes use of the
conservation zone’s
exclusionary
mechanisms.
18Apart from the possible economic multiplier effects of the increased electricity production transmitted to the national
grid that, however, still covers only the central provinces, excluding e.g. Koh Kong.
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resource control may ultimately turn against the regime. Violent concession policies have
increasingly been counteredby communitymobilisation, especially in cases of direct displa-
cement, and support for the regime has shrunk (Biddulph 2014,Milne andMahanty 2015).19
9. Conclusion
Through a study of three CDM hydropower dams located within the protected forests of
the CardamomMountains, we have shown how the interplay of the different logics of gov-
erning the environment, resources and people in Cambodia has materialised in overlap-
ping zones of exclusion that co-produce new relations of resource control. We have
brought to the fore the co-constitutive elements of the zones and the effects of their inter-
connections. Together these have meant more centralised resource control as well as
bracketing of the associated dispossessions. These effects should not be considered a
pre-given end point as the operations and interconnections of the zones maintain con-
siderable indeterminacy. Our analysis has also shed light on the multivalence of the
zones in the sense that the governing capacities they possess may serve also purposes
other than those initially intended. Furthermore, our study has shown how the governing
rationales of territorial fixation and securing of global circulation may shape resource
control in parallel and interacting ways, and that processes of territorial fragmentation
do not necessarily mean compromised state sovereignty.
With this contribution we hope to have demonstrated the potential of an analysis that
takes seriously the overlaps and entanglements of disparate resource control schemes that
often remain invisible and underanalysed in more project-based case studies. Similar, situ-
ated, multi-resource analysis in which the interactions between divergent rationalities and
distinct resource control schemes are considered may also be revealing in other places of
intense resource politics, especially in other dynamic frontier constellations where both
resources and states are in the making. It could be useful also for other studies that
analyse how global climate change initiatives get entangled with on-the-ground relations
of resource control. Furthermore, the conceptual idea of overlapping zones of exclusion
could be generative more broadly in efforts seeking to come to grips with the hetero-
geneous and intersecting spaces of governing.
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